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NOT ALL SLURS ARE EQUAL
abstract
Slurs are typically defined as conveying contempt based on group-membership. However, here I argue 
that they are not a unitary group. First, I describe two dimensions of variation among derogatives: how 
targets are identified, and how offensive the term is. This supports the typical definition of slurs as 
opposed to other derogatives. I then highlight problems with this definition, mainly caused by variable 
offence across slur words. In the process I discuss how major theories of slurs can account for variable 
offence, and conclude that contempt based on group-membership doesn’t cover all the data. I finish by 
noting that the most offensive slurs are those that target oppressed groups. I claim it is oppression that 
underpins most offence, and that beyond this offensive property, some slurs are actively used to oppress.
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NOT ALL SLURS ARE EQUAL
Slurring is a kind of hate speech. Examples most commonly cited in the literature are those 
based on race and ethnicity (“nigger”, “kike”, “chink”, “spic”, “paki”), gender (“bitch”), and 
sexual orientation (“dyke”, “faggot”, “tranny”). Slurs, although pejorative in a broad sense, 
are commonly deemed to be different from pejorative words (“jerk”, “dickhead”, “asshole”, 
“wimp”). In addition, there are words that are clearly derogatory (“fatso”, “wino”, “druggie”, 
“slut”, “commie”), but where there is no universal agreement about the category (pejorative 
or slur) to which they belong. Finally, there are some words with multiple uses, all likely to 
cause offence, one of which is a slur. The most obvious example is “cunt”, which can be used 
either as a swearword, as a vulgar noun, as a pejorative, or as a slur.
Are slurs different from other derogatives? If slurs are special, what makes them special? In 
this short paper, I will try to answer this question. I will come to the conclusion that not all 
words referred to as slurs are special, but that some are. Notably, these are the slurs that are 
most hotly discussed.
Derogative expressions are evaluatives, they express negative attitudes towards the target. 
Examples include [1] to [6]:
[1] “Faggot!”
[2] “He’s a JewC!” (C marks contemptuous intonation).
[3] “Filthy fucking Jew!”
[4] “I hate gays.”
[5] “You dickhead!”
[6] “Hey fatso!”
All the above are expressions of derogation. What makes them different from one another? 
There are two dimensions of variation between these examples that will be important for my 
argument. 
The first dimension is in how the target is identified. In (1) the target is identified by 
membership of a group. This property of derogation based on group-membership is 
characteristic of the word itself, not a property of its use. To see the difference note that in 
(2) contempt is expressed, and that contempt clearly arises from group-membership, but 
1. Introduction
2. Derogatives
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the expression of contempt is by tone. The word “Jew” is perfectly capable of a neutral use.1 
A similar effect to (2) can be achieved by prefacing with expletives as in (3), or by explicitly 
reporting what attitude one has towards the target, say, hate in (4). All of examples (1)-(4) 
concern groups. What they have in common is that they express a negative attitude not just 
towards an individual, but to a group. (4) does this explicitly, but (1)-(3) do this by implication: 
if I hate you because you are a Jew, by default I can be expected to hate all Jewish people. 
Note however that though similar slurring effects arise from using a neutral counterpart with 
contemptuous intonation, or accompanied by expletives as in (2)-(3), they differ substantially 
from a slur term as in (1) in that only the latter has contempt conventionally attached to 
the word as based on the target’s group-membership. For example, the anti-Semite saying 
“Kike” shows contempt for Jews precisely because they are Jews. Contempt and group-
classification are bound together in a slur term so that one cannot do without the other. Not 
so in (2)-(3), where contempt is disjoint from the neutral counterpart, deriving instead from 
external sources to do with the speaker’s own expression of contempt. Remove the contemptuous 
intonation or the expletives, and the offence falls out. The offence would still persist even if 
we were to remove the expletives from “goddamn’ fuckin’ fags”.
On the other hand, (5) targets a particular individual and expresses contempt based on 
personal qualities of that individual. There is no reasonable sense in which we could say that 
(5) derogates the group of all dickheads, in the way that (1) derogates all the gay people. 
Finally, (6) sits in the middle ground between (5) and (1)-(4). If someone is overweight, 
calling them “fatso” is certainly targeting them as an individual, but it is again by implicitly 
expressing a negative attitude towards all people who are overweight. In consequence, while 
there is a coherent movement against “body-shaming”, there is no such movement for the 
protection of “dickheads”. There are quite a number of other derogatives that fall in this 
middle ground. These include “wino”, “druggie”, “commie”, “fatso”, “psycho”. Like pejoratives 
targeted at individuals, they identify the targeted individual on the basis of specific properties 
that s/he has. But like slurs, they express contempt not only about the particular individual 
but also about other people who have similar features, and so may be identified as part of a 
group.
The second dimension of variation is in the intensity of the effects achieved. Most notably, 
different words cause different degrees of offence, and in different patterns. Calling someone a 
“dickhead” is likely to offend them, and probably any close friends. Calling someone a “nigger” 
is considered to be much more offensive, and is offensive to any non-racist who hears it. There 
are also strong differences within the group of words that are group based. For example, as 
noted by Jeshion (2013), “Nigger” is widely considered to be more offensive than “Spook” and 
“Chink”, which are in turn more offensive than “Limey” and “Yankee”. So variation in offence 
is not just between slurs and other pejoratives, but across slur terms themselves.
So, we have two types of differences we can readily identify between derogative words. First, 
how the target is identified. Second, how offensive the word is. 
On this basis it seems reasonable to follow authors like Jeshion, and say that a slur is defined 
as a word that is used to express contempt on the basis of group-membership. On that account 
we would have to allow that the class of derogatives based on properties that many individuals 
share are at least slur-like. This seems on the face of it a satisfactory explanation of what 
makes slurs different from individual pejoratives. 
But this does not explain offence variation across slur terms. This is the knottier problem. 
There are variety of ways of dealing with it. I consider these now.
1  Given its pedigreed history, the neutral term “Jew” has acquired a negative connotation. Similarly, “Indian”. 
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There are several accounts of variable derogation. The ones I will consider are semantic, 
pragmatic, and prohibitionist. 
On a semantic account the variation in offence is a product of the valence of a stereotype 
encoded by a slur word. This is the sort of position that we would take if we were to follow 
Chris Hom in his original 2008 paper on slurs. In that paper he argues that a slur semantically 
encodes a stereotype—i.e. that it predicates a number of negative properties together with 
a set of deontic prescriptions that are externally derived from practices and institutions of 
oppression. Thus, the term “Chink” predicates that the target ought to be discriminated for a 
number of negative stereotypical properties all because of being Chinese. This accounts nicely 
for variable offence across slur terms. Thus the argument would be that “Nigger” contains 
a more negative stereotype than “Chink”, “Spook”, or “Limey”. In particular, the pejorative 
force of a slur word varies given differences in the valence of the semantic content—i.e. the 
amount of negative properties (and consequently the number of deontic prescription) that a 
racist institution conventionally encodes into a slur.
This makes sense as far as it goes, but it struggles to account for all the facts. This is because 
there is a second kind of variation that does not have to do with the words themselves, but 
with their use. For example, in-group uses may cause no offence. If a gay man refers to a gay 
friend as a “faggot”, and the phrase is clearly uttered without contempt, it may well not be 
considered offensive. The same is true of African-Americans using the term “Nigger” to refer 
to one another. But if a white person uses the term to a African-American friend it is much 
more likely to be considered offensive. This causes problems for a strict semanticist, since if 
the offence is really encoded in the word it should be the same offence regardless of who uses 
the word. 
This is strongly suggestive that some portion of the offence is carried by pragmatics. One can 
imagine that an account given in terms of conversational implicature might account for the 
lack of offence of in-group reclaimed uses. However, it is perfectly possible for a gay speaker to 
use [1] to derogate another gay target, so this reasoning isn’t sound. The fact that a slur is used 
by in-group members doesn’t automatically make it inoffensive. So, even when the causal link 
between the slur word and the stereotype (along with associated discriminatory practices) is 
severed on account of the speaker’s group-membership, there is still room for the speaker to 
use the word to express their own contempt. Another route is to claim that there are in fact 
two words, and this is supported, for example, by the fact that there are two spellings of some 
words: “Nigger” and “Nigga” with the second being used exclusively to refer in a friendly, 
in-group context. However, the fact that the second word is not open to use by out-group 
members suggests that the term is not, in reality a separate word. 
What we need to explain is how the word acquires a new convention of use that serves a 
different purpose for the in-group community. What would that other purpose be? Bianchi 
(2014) suggests this may be ironic self-deprecation and jokingly self-mockery so as to take the 
sting out of the ridicule and disdain characteristic from out-group members. This is achieved, 
she argues, through echoing the derogatory uses by bigots in ways that make manifest their 
dissociation from the offensive contents. This is clearly a fairly pragmatic matter that is 
sensitive enough to speaker’s intentions such that it leaves room for in-group members to 
express their own contempt, and hence offend in no dissimilar ways than one would offend 
with an individual pejorative.
There are other semantic theories of slurring offence. The most notable of these is the work 
of Jeshion, who argues for an expressivist semantics. The critical part of this view is that it 
encodes the expression of contempt semantically. This expressivist view has been attacked 
for not being able to account for variable derogation across words. The argument against is as 
follows. If the semantic expression of contempt is uniform across all slurs in that a common 
3. Accounting 
for Variable 
Derogation
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core attitude is expressed, then Jeshion’s semantics cannot explain variable offence as being 
caused by variable contempt. Critics claim that this makes it impossible for expressivism to 
explain variable offence, and thus reject it (Hom 2008).
There are two ways out of this for the expressivist. First, it could be maintained that different 
words encode varying degrees of contempt, and that it is the degree of contempt expressed 
that causes the variation in contempt. Jeshion does not propose this, but it seems prima facie 
that there is nothing wrong with this approach. Certainly it seems intuitive to talk about 
varying degrees of contempt. People regularly use expressions such as “utter contempt”, 
“complete contempt”, and “beneath contempt”. This suggests that contempt may at least be a 
property capable of variation, whether or not that can be semantically encoded in words that 
signal it. 
One option for expressivism is to model this variation along similar lines to the variation in the 
degrees of emotion expressed with ordinary evaluative terms (e.g. “good”, “great”, “wonderful”). 
Potts (2007) applies this model to expressive words such as “damn”, “hurray”. Imagine, for 
example, someone uttering “Trump is a damn republican”. “Damn” signals here a negative 
shift in the speaker’s attitude towards Trump’s being a republican. However, if the speaker is a 
Trump-supporter she might utter “Trump is a damn fine republican” to convey that she has a 
positive attitude. Thus, what explains the variation is a function shifting the “expressive index” 
of the conversational context so that an expressive word may be taken to semantically express 
varying degrees of intensity of the emotion expressed in a context, and how they may differ 
across contexts. On this model then, using a slur could be treated as updating the common 
ground with information about the speaker’s negative attitudes toward the targeted individual, 
and toward members of the group as a whole. Thus, different slurs may be conventionally 
associated with varying degrees of strength of negativity depending on the stereotypes that are 
drawn upon as the basis for the negative attitudes conventionally expressed.
A second way out, pointed out by Jeshion herself, is through pragmatics. This would provide 
a different way to handle the issue of variability of offence across uses. Thus, different 
contexts would modify the contempt expressed semantically. It could be that such a route is 
complementary to the first, that different words may express variable contempt, and also that 
this contempt expressed semantically may be further modulated by the context. 
However, there is a problem if we ground offence in contempt expression alone. It is that there 
are many words that can be used to express great contempt, and yet which are not nearly 
as offensive as slurs. I can call someone the “scum of the earth”, but I will not be ostracised 
by polite society for so doing. This suggests that there really is something else going on than 
contempt expression, although contempt expression is clearly part of the picture. 
This is what leads us to another route, that of prohibitionism. Anderson and Lepore (2013) 
propose that what makes slurs offensive is that they are prohibited, and that different words 
are prohibited to different degrees. Prohibitionism neatly accounts for why slurring uses 
are also offensive, for example, during speech reports. What prohibitionism doesn’t neatly 
account for is why some uses are acceptable, such as the reclaimed uses mentioned above. The 
argument made is that there are exceptions on the prohibition in certain circumstances, so 
that the prohibition is lifted for in-group uses. This allows consistency with the data, but at the 
price of a satisfying explanation.
In fact, the route into explaining why slurs differ so greatly in their offence, while also 
accounting for their group identifying nature, lies elsewhere.
155
NOT ALL SLURS ARE EQUAL
Consider the slur terms that most deeply offend: “Nigger”, “Chink”, “Bitch”, “Wetback”, 
“Faggot”. Now consider this paragraph from the “Five Faces of Oppression” by Iris Young 
(1990: 42):
I offer some explication of the concept of oppression as I understand its use by new 
social movements in the United States since the 1960s. My starting point is reflection 
on the conditions of the groups said by these movements to be oppressed: among 
others women, Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish speaking Americans, 
American Indians, Jews, lesbians, gay men, Arabs, Asians, old people, working-class 
people, and the physically and mentally disabled.
Is it coincidence that many of the most offensive slur words are associated with groups we 
might identify as oppressed? I suggest that it is not. Consider slurs for groups that have been 
oppressed: “Redskin”, “Kike”, “Faggot”, “Towel-head”, “Chink”. These number among the 
most offensive words we have. Then consider the existence of slurs for groups that historically 
have not been oppressed: “Yankees”, “Brits”, “Bosch”, “Ivan”. There are also numerous 
derogatives for the rich and powerful: “toff”, “Hooray Henry”, “toffee nose”, “upper class 
twit”, “filthy rich”. Yet despite conveying considerable contempt these words are, frankly, 
mildly offensive at best. Neither are they prohibited. Why is that? My suggestion is that it is 
socially acceptable to slur the powerful, precisely because they are powerful, and it does them 
no harm.
The evidence thus points to a differentiation between words on the basis of oppression. Slurs 
are not a unitary group of words on the basis of group membership. There are a variety of 
slurs, and only some of them are deeply offensive. The common pattern is that words that we 
prohibit are words that refer to the oppressed. Thus, my claim is that not all slurs are equal. 
Some slurs refer to oppressed groups, and some do not. The first are broadly considered 
offensive, and the second are not, or at least to a lesser degree. It is oppression that is the fuel 
of deep offence.
In one sense this is not yet new; most slurs are written about in the literature precisely 
because they are words used to target oppressed groups. But by focusing on slurs that target 
oppressed groups we ignore that many slur terms do not. Highlighting this should change how 
we delineate between slurs and other derogative terms.
But there is some subtlety required here. First of all, there are many words that do refer to 
groups we should objectively identify as oppressed, but which, at the current time, are seen 
by many in polite society as acceptable to use. Thus, take words such as “wrinkly’, “old fart”, 
“coffin dodger”, “kev”, “chav”, and so on. These words also target oppressed groups, those 
who are marginalised or exploited. Yet many who would find racial slurs offensive, do not find 
these words offensive. This needs to be explained. It may be that, unfortunately, the degree 
of oppression suffered by these groups is considered by polite society to be acceptable. If this 
were the case, then the degree of offence is related to the degree to which oppression is seen 
as being socially unacceptable. This is a complex phenomenon, which will require unpacking.
There is another consequence of this division into words that target oppressed groups, and 
words that target non-oppressed groups. It is that the former group of words do not just seek 
to describe oppression, they seek to actively create it and maintain it. Thus, some slurs are 
part of the mechanism of oppression. They are actively part of the process of oppressing other 
groups. To see this we need only consider the way that slur terms and hate speech are being 
used in contemporary political discourse. Specifically, if we consider contemporary events 
4. Some slurs are 
not like others
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in politics2, slurs, and derogatives more generally, are being used as tools for incitement to 
persuade one group that sees itself as disempowered to gain power by oppressing another. 
Scapegoating and hate speech are used to silence others by fear, and as ways of emotionally 
appealing to would-be bigots to join the side of the bigot. For example, Trump supporters 
have been quoted as referring to Muslims as “Muzzies” and “Mo-slimes”. A journalist noting 
this, who happened to be Jewish, received messages such as “Milbank is an anti-white parasite 
and a bigoted kike supremacist” (Milbank 2015). This journalist also records attendees at 
an event assault a Black Lives Matter protester while shouting “Light the motherfucker on 
fire”, and shouting to Latinos “motherfucking tacos—go back to Mexico”. This highlights that 
the purpose of slurs is not one merely of derogation, but one of oppression. Slurs unleash a 
propensity for violence, create fear in their targets, and make it more permissible for others to 
give voice to their bigotry to the extent that it is treated as acceptable by political leaders. 
This ability to incite to action is discussed by Tirrell (2012), who argues that “deeply derogative 
terms” are words that serve not only to enjoin others to hatred but also to action. In the 
Rwanda genocide dehumanising slurs have actively served as “action-engendering” and have 
thus been “part and parcel of genocide, not only an antecedent of it”. They motivated Hutu 
to action by depriving Tutsi of their humanity: by labelling them as “inyenzi” (cockroach) or 
“inzoka” (snake), this granted permission to hate and a mandate to kill. As Tirrell says (2012: 
174), “understanding these speech-acts helps to illuminate the important ways that power is 
enacted through discourse, how speech-acts can prepare the way for physical and material 
acts, and how speech generates permissions for actions hitherto uncountenanced.”
My closing contention is that we thus need to distinguish between the broader group of 
slurs, and a smaller group that I will call oppressive slurs. Further, I claim that what is centrally 
interesting about oppressive slurs is how they contribute to achieving oppression. I will 
close by suggesting that a promising route is via an extension to speech act theory. Words, as 
pointed by Austin (1962), don’t describe the world, they alter it. Exactly how is a matter for 
enquiry.
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